The official announcement on Turkey's military involvement against Syria was made by Defense Minister Hulusi Akar on March 1, 2020. He stressed that military actions against the Syrian government army would be conducted only in the republic's northwestern part in order to recover balance of all the opposing forces in the Idlib de-escalation zone which existed as of the date the Sochi agreements were signed in September 2018.
"We expect Russia to stop the regime's attacks and to use their influence to ensure the regime withdraws to the borders of the Sochi agreement," Hulusi Akar said, pointing to the Turkish operation's successful development.
In fact, the Turkish General Staff planned the engagement of Turkish troops alongside the opposition Syrian National Army, the backbone of which is represented by detachments of the terrorist Hayat Tahrir al-sham (HTS or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant) and the Muslim Brotherhood, banned in Russia and Turkey, back on February 27, 2020. The cause behind this was the death of 36 Turkish soldiers who were part of a terrorist column moving from the Turkish border to the province of Idlib.
Groups of Muslim radicals, aided by the Turkish army's strong artillery and air support, launched a decisive offensive against the Syrian government forces in multiple directions in the provinces of Latakia, Hama (east) and Idlib (south and south-east). Over the five days of fierce fighting, anti-government forces managed to regain control of several dozen localities, some of which were of high tactical significance.
During this period, the Syrian government army lost two SU-24 bombers, several dozen tanks, IFVs, rocket artillery launchers, field guns, cars, and two anti-aircraft guns. Several ammunition depots were destroyed. According to independent observers, the total loss of Syrian troops and their allied militia units accounts for several hundred people. During the last hours of March 2 alone, about 100 dead and more than a hundred wounded people were delivered to hospitals in the cities of Hama and Aleppo.
On March 3, Turkish fighters shot down an L39 training fighter of the Syrian air force over the Idlib province. One of the pilots was killed.
Most losses suffered by the Syrian troops were caused by Turkish artillery strikes and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPASs). In response to the February 28 destruction of two bombers, the SAR armed forces command announced a ban on Turkish aviation flights in the country's airspace, shooting down a strike reconnaissance RPAS of the Turkish air force.
Ankara asked Moscow to factor in Damascus' cancelling this decision but was rebuffed: according to the Syrian command, the bombers were destroyed by Turkish fighters that invaded the country's airspace.
On March 1, Turkey used an attack in mass formation on government troops and military facilities. According to the Syrian side, up to 20-30 drones were involved in simultaneous strikes in some areas. The advanced units of the Syrian force did not have a military air defense system, and the few anti-aircraft weapons available were partially destroyed or failed to perform the tasks assigned. That's what accounted for huge manpower and military equipment losses.
By the end of March 2, the activity of the enemy's combat operations had sharply decreased. The sides switched to positional defense. The Turkish command started regrouping its forces and allied detachments of Muslim radicals. During March 3, the Turks pulled their units and Muslim detachments from the depths of the Idlib zone in contemplation of the proceeded offensive.
At the same time, Turkish military intelligence initiated mass armed clashes with units of the Syrian government army in the southern Deraa Governorate. The Muslim Brotherhood groups that emerged from the underground launched sudden attacks on numerically insignificant garrisons of troops, roadblocks and local government offices, killing and taking military and civilian hostages in dozens of localities. The command of the 4th and 9th divisions stationed in the province was forced to throw troops at suppressing the rebellion, instead of strengthening government forces in the country's north-west.
Thus, there is a high-stress situation in the Idlib zone. The government army command does not likely possess sufficient forces to recover balance and is forced to temporarily switch to a hedgehog defense in anticipation of a the enemy's possible offensive.
There is a good chance that in the near future, on the eve of President Recep Erdogan's planned visit to Moscow on March 5, 2020, Ankara will push its allies to take decisive offensive actions and, enjoying Turkey's active support, will try to throw the Syrian government army away from the Idlib de-escalation zone. At the talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Turkish leader expects to transform military successes into political concessions.
At the same time, it should be noted that the Russian military and political leadership has a composed and reserved attitude. On the one hand, it does not respond to the sometimes hostile attacks of Turkey's political and military elite. On the other hand, Moscow savors strongly of deliberately restricting Damascus in the use of military and military-technical means available to the Syrian command, in order to deal a fatal blow to the Turkish troops and their radical Islamic allies in the Syrian territory.
It is not implausible that Russia will give the go-ahead to the Syrians to snub the aggressor and will itself "engage" in eliminating terrorists originating from a number of Russian and former Soviet regions in case of a repeated enemy offensive against the Syrian armed forces.
