The key objective of the tough dialogue is reaching agreements to stop the war in the north-west of Syria and restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity under terms mutually acceptable for Damascus, Moscow and Ankara.

The current negotiations will be perhaps the most difficult and tense over the entire period of Russian-Turkish cooperation within the Astana process. The summit was preceded by four rounds of consultations between the military and diplomatic missions of both countries that ended indecisively due to insurmountable differences.

According to information leaked to the Turkish press, the presidents of Russia and Turkey Vladimir Putin and Turkey Recep Erdogan will have to hammer out a compromise on at least ten overriding issues related to further actions in the Syrian Arab Republic. Save and except prospects for further bilateral relations.

On March 1, Turkey officially launched a military operation in the Idlib de-escalation zone despite Russia's warnings about its disastrous consequences. The brunt of its implementation is assigned to the Turkish-allied armed groups of the Syrian opposition and Muslim extremists under the auspices of the banned terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (former Jabhat al-Nusra).

Enjoying direct air, artillery, and logistic support from Ankara, radical groups have now driven government forces back in several areas. At the upcoming Moscow talks, Erdogan intends to ride the coattails of this success to achieve Russia's assistance in Syria's fulfillment of Turkish conditions.

- Ankara demands that Moscow ensure the withdrawal of all the Syrian government troops from the Idlib zone beyond the red line stipulated by the Sochi agreements of September 2018.

At the latest negotiations of joint missions Moscow gave Ankara a map with an offer to place a limited contingent of Turkish troops and Syrian opposition units 5 to 19 kilometers away the state border.

- Turkey demands Russia's assistance in signing an indefinite agreement with Syria that will provide for a permanent deployment of its troops in the Arab country under the pretext of ensuring safety of the southern regions.

Moscow stands for implementing the Sochi agreements and respecting UN Security Council resolution 2254 that provide for preserved sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Russia believes that Turkish-Syrian cooperation on security should be only based on the 1998 agreement signed in Adana, which allows Turkey, as agreed with the Syrian government, to send a limited contingent of troops to this country for a period of up to one month to a range of 5 kilometers away from the state border.

- Ankara does not intend to implement the Sochi agreements on separating moderate (secular) Syrian opposition groups from irreconcilable armed groups of Muslim radicals listed among terrorist groups in the UN, Russia, Turkey and other countries. The Turks explain their refusal by the mentioned zone's being home to more than 3.5 million civilians supporting the militants, whom Ankara considers "rebels fighting for their rights against a dictatorial regime".

Moscow supports the SAR government's right of using force to neutralize illegal armed groups throughout the state. The Russian leadership makes no secret of the fact that it will use every means to help the Syrian government army in completely defeating terrorist groups in conformity with the mutual assistance treaty and at the invitation of official Damascus.

- Turkey advocates active involvement of the UN, Western Europe and other states in the Syrian conflict settlement.

Russia is adamantly opposed to lending a broad international touch to the conflict, and insists on a greater involvement of Iran as a full-fledged ally in the Astana negotiations.

- Turkey insists on maintaining its military presence in the city of Saraqib, offering to create a joint observation post with Russia to monitor the movement of Syrian troops, civilians and goods.

Russia will by all means seek Turkey's providing unhindered and safe communications along the Damascus-Aleppo and Aleppo-Latakia highways through the cities of Saraqib and Jisr al-Shughur. In this regard, Moscow suggests organizing a joint regular Russian-Turkish-Iranian highway patrol, insisting on a complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from the city of Saraqib.

- Ankara is opposed to the handover of the Zāwiya heights that dominate the south of Idlib province to the Syrian army, because the place is perfect for conducting artillery fire on the Aleppo-Jisr al-Shughur-Latakia highway.

Moscow will cheer moves by the Syrian troops to seize the dominant heights and clear the area of militants.

- Currently, the Turkish armed forces are stationed at 50 observation posts in the governorates of Hama, Aleppo and Idlib. Ankara intends to maintain them for an indefinitely long period of time.

Russia does not yet demand an immediate closing-up of these Turkish facilities, but is fully supportive of the Syrian leadership in their being evacuated at the request of Damascus without conditions after things in the north-west start looking up.

- Turkey demands signing a treaty on introducing a no-fly zone for Russian and Syrian combat aircraft over the northern part of Syria. The zone's overall area should include the territories of the Turkish armed forces' operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield, i.e. more than a third of the Syrian territory. According to the Turks, allowed to the airspace of this area are only reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Russia will never agree to this demand.