Apart from abundant weapons concentrated around the Kaliningrad region, which was ultimately transferred to the USSR after the World War II, as well as combined military exercises in close proximity to it, the most bellicose countries of the Alliance are trying to provide information cover for their own large-scale military buildup in the Baltic region.

To this end, what-if scenarios for the situation development in relation to the Kaliningrad region are being invented by the NATO headquarters in Brussels and a number of research centers in the West, with "profound concern" being expressed.

One of the scenarios involves launching an initiative missile strike from its territory by the Russian armed forces against a number of states in the Baltic region and Central Europe, including NATO military facilities. Along with that, Moscow is known to have never declared planning such actions or created a formidable material basis to implement them by means of frontal offensive operations, and with the seizure of foreign territories yet.

Another claim is based on the transatlantic alliance's desire to "strengthen security" in the Baltic sea area and territories surrounding it. But the Russian side is allegedly creating insurmountable military-technical and political-diplomatic obstacles along this track.

In order to deliver information pressure on Moscow, NATO has long practiced unfounded accusations against the Russian side of its "non-compliance" with the current multilateral Open Skies Treaty as regards the Kaliningrad region. The Russian side is said to obstruct other member states' inspection teams flights over its territory. But such a claim is unfounded, since the Treaty enables any of its members to impose restrictions on flights of foreign inspection teams, for instance, in high-density civil aviation air traffic zones. In the present instance, this applies to the flight zone of Khrabrovo airport – the only civil airfield of domestic and international importance operating in this Russian exclave.

The NATO leadership has repeatedly advanced three more claims against Moscow, that, in its opinion, must be resolved without delay.

States of the North Atlantic Alliance have repeatedly, including with the help of Finland being a non-member, tried to draw attention of the Baltic and world public to the fact that Russian military aircraft fly with their transponders turned off in the Baltic sea area. The Russian side has met these wishes. More than a year ago, it proposed that NATO countries resolve this issue through the prism of reciprocity. Namely, it has taken the initiative to allow military aircraft of the parties flying in the airspace over the Baltic region to use transponders, as the civil aircraft do. But NATO  came up with an adamant refusal.

The Alliance's leadership has repeatedly drawn attention of the Russian side to the "dangerous" convergence of the parties' military aircraft and warships in the Baltic zone. But when Moscow suggested that the Alliance agree on the minimum permissible approach distances for Russian and NATO warships and aircraft during their movement in the region, the Alliance headquarters ignored this initiative either.

Naturally, Russia has been and will have to respond to the increased activity of the NATO air force and navy just off the Russian borders. It should be noted that such activity has increased many times in recent years, and it would be extremely reckless from the perspective of the Russian Federation's national security interests not to track the movements of such forces in the region, as well as the flights of US heavy strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons. This problem could have an even simpler solution than working out some kind of joint agreements on "military restraint". NATO warships and aircraft need to appear in the region as rarely as possible. It's not the Gulf of Mexico after all.

The propaganda machine of the West would raise a disturbance wave about military exercises of the Russian armed forces in the West. NATO's pet fancy. Meanwhile, the Alliance itself has doubled their number in recent years: up to 250-300 drills annually, with about half being anti-Russian. But when about a year ago Russia handed to the bloc headquarters a proposal to move the parties' exercise zone from the contact line to an authorized depth, NATO member states once again refused to discuss the issue.

Against this background, the Russian side made the only right conclusion that plans of this military bloc do not include the development and implementation of joint measures to strengthen confidence and promote security in the Baltic zone.  And they never will.

A natural question arises here: why does one need to highlight all of these problems, which NATO has no desire to negotiate with Russia on? Should one expect some unilateral steps and concessions from Russia just because someone in the Alliance wants this? A waste of time today and a blemish job in the future.