The last few months have seen an increasingly evident process of softening positions towards Russian gas in Europe. And yest, sanctions pressure on Russia’s fuel and energy complex is on the rise, accompanied by the general pervasive "Gazpromophobic" mainstream. Nevertheless, Brussels is hardly ready for radical prohibitive measures, because this will only undermine European energy security potential and industrial sector economic performance (especially the bloc’s industrial power cars — Germany, Italy, France).
Throughout the war in Ukraine, there have been sixteen EU sanctions packages targeting the Russian fuel and energy complex, and the 17th one is currently underway. In this regard, Gazprom is forced to actively reorient to other markets due to objectors and other obstacles.
Given the company’s reduced European gas market share, not only the United States and a number of other LNG exporters but also Norway, which supplies pipeline gas to European countries, has strengthened its hand. This Scandinavian state may have been the key beneficiary over the recent years: since 2022, there has been Gazprom's active squeezing out of Europe, letting Norway supply gas to the EU in bulk right via the main pipeline.
A Norwegian Offshore Directorate (NOD) review found that the country had increased its natural gas production to a record 124 billion cubic meters in 2024. The previous 122.8bn maximum was recorded back in 2022. Last year’s overall hydrocarbon production amounted to some 240 million cubic meters of oil equivalent to become the highest figure since 2009. "Production on the shelf is expected to remain at a stable, high level over the next two-to-three years, and will then gradually decline towards the end of the 2020s," the report says.
By the end of December 2024, 94 fields were being developed on the Norwegian shelf (none were closed), including the North Sea’s Hanz and Tyrving. The start of production at Johan Castberg in the Barents Sea is scheduled for the first quarter of 2025.
NOD notes that several new fields are going to be put into operation over the next few years, with a number of existing ones decommissioned though. Last year, oil and gas companies drilled 42 wells, of which sixteen were recognized as productive. According to the Directorate's forecast, the company will drill up to fifty exploration wells this year, including 20 to 25 in the North Sea.
Investments in Norway’s offshore projects are expected to reach NOK 267 billion ($23.4bn) in 2025, which is 2.5 percent higher as compared to the last year.
Nevertheless, prerequisites for a decrease in domestic oil and gas production are becoming increasingly clear in Norway. And the NOD's forecast that the level of national gas production is going to stay unchanged for another three to four years is a truly optimistic assessment, and the decline may well begin earlier. This actually allows for an expanded Russian gas producer presence in the European market. For example, this is what head of energy analytics at ICIS Andreas Schroeder noted in his January interview with The Telegraph: "Dusk for Norway is dawn for Russia. Russia is unlikely to dominate Europe again as in the past when it had nearly 40 percent market share. But the call to open the pipes and gates for cheap Russian gas will get louder over time as gas prices increase with dwindling Norwegian output. It creates a case for more cooperation with Russia and will encourage Russia-friendly politicians in countries like Slovakia and Hungary."
Since 1971, Norway has been extracting oil and gas from 123 fields. By the end of 2023, their number decreased to 92, including 67 in the North Sea, 23 in the Norwegian Sea, and two in the Barents Sea. “In total, Norway’s fields contain 251m barrels of recoverable oil,” The Telegraph writes. Citing the NOD review, it reports that exports peaked in 2024, but now supplies will begin to decline due to both the depleted resource base, and growing political support for doing away with fossil fuels and the government’s course towards a "managed green transition."
In general, Oslo will have to not only overcome issues associated with its falling domestic production due to hydrocarbon shelf resource base depletion, but also deal with returning to a tough competitive environment, since Gazprom will get to enjoy more chances to take a foothold in the EU. A fresh signal to that effect was Bloomberg’s report in early March that Brussels strategy to "phase out" Russian energy supplies to the EU may feature mitigating adjustments. It remains to be seen how drastic they will turn out after all. So far, according to the agency, the European Commission has postponed release of its roadmap for a final and phased refusal of Russian fossils, originally scheduled for March 26; without announcing a new date.
One also has to bear in mind that Norway is part of the pool of states supplying weapons to Ukraine and actively engages in it. Moreover, it not just formally "joined" the militaristic initiative as part of the notorious European solidarity, but is definitely an active ideological player against the Russian Federation (being a NATO member since alliance came into being in 1949). Norway started supplying weapons and military equipment to Ukraine as early as in 2022, including NLAW (Next Generation Light Antitank Weapon) missiles, artillery systems, howitzers, various types of small arms ammunition, and protective equipment like bulletproof vests, helmets, etc.
In 2024, Norway gave NOK 75 billion (about $7.1bn) to Ukraine as part of its five-year Nansen Support Program. The current year already saw NOK 15 billion allocated, half of which is intended for military assistance. Also, Norway has simplified its arms export rules, providing for direct sales to Ukraine, along with ongoing donations, including NASAMS systems and ammunition manufactured by Nammo.
Besides, Norway has lashed out on millions of dollars in direct financial assistance to support the Ukrainian budget, as well as humanitarian aid. Finally, as one of Europe’s largest gas producers, Oslo offered assistance in ensuring Ukraine's energy safety, gas supplies and cooperation in renewable energy sources included.
Apart from the standard European actions as regards Ukraine, Norway does clearly have a commercial interest in deterring its competitor (Gazprom), as financing the military assistance program to the Kiev regime drags out the conflict, thus lowering Ukraine’s transit status altogether.
Meanwhile, the latter has its gas transportation system stand idle: Russian supplies to the EU were halted starting January 1, 2025, since Kiev did not renew the transit contract with Moscow.
