The tension in Japanese-American relations caused by Trump's aggressive tariff policy has been on the rise. The next stage of this process will be a visit to Japan by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth scheduled for next week. Everything suggests that the commercialization of allied relations undertaken by the Americans will undoubtedly affect Japan as well. Europe has been already reciprocating Trump on the issue, and Japan will not be found wanting. Not for the first time.
Hegseth will visit the Pacific island of Iwo Jima (referred to as Ioto in Japan) to engage in a joint memorial ceremony with Japan to mark the 80th World War II end anniversary.
The island, located about 1,200 kilometers south of Tokyo, was considered vital to both sides during the war. Japan saw it as a defense stronghold, and the United States viewed it as a key base for air strikes on the main islands of the Japanese archipelago. In the US, an epic statue depicting marines raising the American flag on Mount Suribachi was even erected outside the Arlington Cemetery to memorize the battle. In less than two months of fighting, about 7,000 American and 21,900 Japanese soldiers died there. Far from Stalingrad, of course, but also a symbol — today of the indestructible American-Japanese military alliance.
Accordingly, the top agenda item of Hegseth's visit will be negotiations with Japanese Defense Minister Gen. Gen Nakatani. According to Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell, the ceremony and the minister's visit in general will "contribute to further efforts to strengthen our alliances and partnerships in line with the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region." Too good to be true, though.
On the eve of the American minister’s visit, the BBC and CNN reported that the Pentagon, as part of saving public funds, is ready to abandon plans announced less than a year ago to create an operational military command in Japan. The new structure was expectedly intended to facilitate deeper cooperation between the United States and the Japanese armed forces amid growing tensions with China and Russia, as well as strengthened cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. "The United States will upgrade the US Forces Japan to a joint force headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities," US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told reporters in late July last year. "This will be the most significant change to US Forces Japan since its creation, and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years." It seemingly isn’t.
Conspicuous is the following fact.
The new structure was created largely under pressure and at request by Japan to demonstrate the inviolability of the Japanese-American military alliance to China, and mollify Tokyo, which was accumulating vague doubts about whether the United States would stand up for Japan in case of a conflict with the region’s nuclear powers — China or the DPRK. Perhaps the Japanese military and politicians also considered creating a new headquarters as a stage along the path towards their cherished goal of being part of US nuclear planning in the region. At least, the Biden administration made advances of the kind.
Now, as part of a large-scale campaign to reduce government spending, Trump has apparently decided to abandon this PR scarecrow in order to save taxpayers $1.1bn supposed for the new structure. For now, the decades-old headquarters of the Indo-Pacific Military Command, located in Hawaii, 7,500 kilometers from the front line, i.e. from Japan, surrounded by enemies, is enough.
Yes, during Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's visit to Washington in February, Trump reaffirmed the need to "further strengthen" US and Japanese respective command and control systems. But it seems that in practical matters, the American president pays little attention to the mantras recorded in joint diplomatic documents.
Japanese Cabinet Secretary General Hayashi Yoshimasa said amid American media reports: "We would like to continue close negotiations between Japan and the United States on further strengthening deterrence and response capabilities within the framework of the Japanese-American alliance, including improving corresponding command and control systems," but there is little confidence in his words.
The American media report that this step will be part of a large-scale campaign to significantly reduce the US Defense Department budget for a total of $800bn, providing for the unification of combat units and abandoning the role of supreme commander of the united NATO forces in Europe. In fact, Washington is "considering unilateral changes on key strategic issues, including significant cuts in the number of American troops abroad," said Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Roger Wicker, and House Armed Services Committee head Mike Rogers.
But this are by no means all the incremental changes expected from Washington in its military cooperation with Japan.
Trump considers Japan a freeloader as regards its own defense, just like Europe. In his last cadence, the phrase became famous: "If Japan is attacked, we will fight World War III and they can watch it on a Sony television." There was certain truth in this at the time, since the military alliance treaty did not involve Japan's engagement in hostilities outside its own territory. The country’s Constitution features harsh restrictions on this. Ex-Prime Minister Abe legislated the issue, though without changes to the Constitution, and the problem seems to have been resolved now. But Trump does not think so, if we judge by his recent statements, and Tokyo deems this as a hint that they will have to pay up eventually.
During his visit to Japan, Hegseth will almost certainly demand spending more on both their own defense and deploying American troops.
Japan has already declared readiness to allocate two percent of its GDP for defense by 2027. However, March 4 saw Elbridge Colby nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy say in US Senate that Japan should spend as much as three percent of GDP on defense.
Apparently, Trump will also demand that Tokyo increase its contribution to the cost of deploying American troops in Japan, since the five-year bilateral agreement on military bases expires in 2027. Tokyo covers over 85 percent of Japanese-stationed US armed forces’ operating expenses, which is much more than the 30-40 percent assumed by Germany, South Korea and other allies. During his first cadence, Trump demanded that Japan pay for the bases in full altogether.
In addition, expenses emerge for relocating American troops in Okinawa away from residential buildings, which also requires lots of money.
There will also be a question about the purchase of American weapons. Trump's tough stance on Japan's military spending during his first term led Tokyo to purchase 105 F35B carrier-based fighter jets from the United States worth $24bn and to sign a contract for two Aegis Ashore missile defense systems worth $1.2bn.
There is all but no alternative for Japan to agree with Trump.
While Europe still can discuss the issue of its own armed forces and the French nuclear umbrella, things are different in the Far East. Japan has no real allies other than the United States. Defense relations with South Korea have just recovered from a protracted crisis caused by another scandal involving compensation for victims of the Japanese colonial regime. But in general, military and political relations with Seoul are burdened with mutual grievances and have been only built with the mediation of the United States.
Japan would prefer to keep aloof from Taiwan, which is the most obvious trigger of the armed conflict in the region. The Philippines, Washington’s another military ally in Asia, is hardly the best asset for Tokyo's security, say the least of it.
Japan can only slightly scare the United States with creating its own nuclear weapons or "make eyes" at the Chinese by intensifying bilateral dialogue with Beijing. Or start talking about revising the status of American military bases in Japan and creating an eastern-style NATO, which Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba surprised the public last year. But the cost of these propaganda and diplomatic efforts is minor: Japan looks defenseless when lacking a strong alliance with the United States. And the American nuclear umbrella has no alternative in the Far East, as well as in Europe. We will have to agree to everything — an increase in both US tariffs on Japanese cars and defense spending.
