But its well-known that both the Premier and President of Ukraine ignored the meeting with the Moscow guest. For example, Victor Yuschenko, a polite host of the celebration, was busy with cancelling jubilee postage-stamps. The guest himself expressed gratitude to the hosts standing against empty flagpoles. In contrast, another invited guest, Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I, was welcomed at the top level. In short, Kiev has demonstrated very distinctly who is who. We will not advise the Russian Foreign Ministry to procure old-fashioned minibus Lliv to meet high-ranking Ukrainian guest next time. Let us clarify the situation, which is slightly hazed with golden embroidery and prayers for universal blessing…
There are about 65 per cent of Orthodox Christians of the 46-million Ukrainian population. Of them about 60 per cent prefer neither the Moscow nor Kiev Patriarchate suspecting evil tricks in the political split. 23 of the remaining 40 per cent are hard-line fellows of the Kiev Patriarchate, 15 per cent - of the Moscow Patriarchate and 2 per cent - of the Ukrainian autocephalous church (which is regarded as a schismatic church since 1917). They are three main Orthodox communities of Ukraine. The 60 per cent that still fail to select - Kiev or Moscow - are regarded as a spiritual reserve by both capitals. Moscow proceeds from the fact that the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is an only church recognized in the Orthodox world. Since in both countries the church is separated from the state we believe that the matters of religious order are not subject to political regulation.
Meanwhile, Kiev comes more and more tough to deny formula “two countries – one church”. Therefore the Kiev authorities approached Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I for assistance. The Russian Orthodox Church recognizes his authority because the Orthodoxy in Russia has its origin in Byzantium. But the relationship between the two patriarchates is far from being ideal – from 1997 (?) Bartholomew sees Canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church within the boundaries of 1591, i.e. without Ukraine and Belorussia. Yet, it would not be less logical to limit this territory with the area of Kreschatik of 988. Anyway, the today’s “Constantinople” “takes care” of Orthodox Christians in Turkey, Greece, Finland, Estonia and even expat communities all over the world. The population of the “Constantinople” lambs is about 3 million versus tens of millions in the Russian Orthodox Church. But the point is not in the ratio. Kiev wants to split the Orthodox church into “pro-Moscow” and “anti-Moscow”. In particular, it is a response of western “laypersons” to the integration of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia (ROCOR) with its Moscow foremother.
Yuschenko still fails to receive “Constantinople” blessing. But the all-out Kiev’s anti-Russian offensive leads not only to a split of the Orthodox Ukrainians. The spiritual split of the two nations is premised with a conceptual-ideological split (or its aggravation) with geopolitical aspirations. In the logic of executioner-victim contraposition at least four interrelated historical layers or notable events of our common history are exploited. The first, at the cartoon level the version of fraternity with Russia is interpreted as a result of foreign falsehood multiplied by domestic traitorousness. Didn’t they need to use the Patriarch of Constantinople to historically devaluate the term of “Kievan Rus”? The second, Holodomor of 1932-33 is officially and obtrusively interpreted as an example of anti-Ukrainian “Holocaust”. Old blames are added with new ones – Lvov Holodomor of 1947. It is not excluded that now any mass burial discovered in the territory of Ukraine including that of a war-time will be treated as evidence of “genocide”. The third, World War II is interpreted as a series of Moscow’s errors and misdeeds that affected the fate of Ukraine. And the fourth, the Chernobyl disaster is treated as a “nation extermination” action.
Let us outline briefly what stands behind it. The first, “the historically proved vulnerability” of Ukraine justifies its aspirations to NATO. On the eve of “the autumn-winter season” of rapprochement with the Alliance this issue seems topical. The second, the potential of Russophobia , which has “an export value”, may be called for in the energy dialogue of the West with Russia. Ukraine expects to receive “a commission”. The third, the expanded perception of Moscow’s “crimes” incites at least Eastern Europe to lay new claims to us for compensation of “the occupation”. In this sense the Ukrainian Grivna may multiply the aggregated “euro bill”.
Let us summarize the Moscow’s position. In case of the church split the adherers of friendship with Moscow will be definitely supported by their Russian fellows. In so doing, the consolidating slogans are more efficient than dissociating one. None of the Soviet Constitutions contained a word on the national contraposition. And references to “well-known facts” may never substitute the legal act. The international legal dismantling of the entire Soviet policy will at least challenge the territorial acquisitions of the Ukrainians. And finally, no one prayer ever denied a worldly wisdom: “Fool looks for friends overseas, and enemies – next door”…
