For one thing, long ago, immediately after the Soviet collapse and the formation of independent Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the West began the search for a reliable and, most importantly, quite obedient strategic partner in the Transcaucasus - a region of great importance not only because of oil interests, but also for other reasons, of which the conversation is yet to come.
Of these three, of course, Azerbaijan was of greatest interest to Western politicians, with its oil resources and access to the Caspian Sea. But Baku has never particularly wanted to work in close alliance with the West. The leader of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, who seized power in 1992, treated the West and Russia antipathetically. He has held a course for a close alliance with Turkey. But the experienced politician Heydar Aliyev who superseded Elchibey as president, began to steer much more reasonable course. Without changing anything in relations with Turkey, he established a dialogue simultaneously with the West and Moscow.
Aliyev, a recent member of the Politbureau of the CPSU CC, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, connected with Moscow by his political career, was too intelligent and far-sighted to run the risk of confrontation with the post-Soviet Russia. Quite the contrary, he sought to strengthen relations with it, with the understanding that among other things without Moscow’s participation and mediation it is impossible to solve the extremely painful for his country Karabakh problem. So, he was not going to irritate Moscow with a close rapprochement with the West, though afforded the American and other companies an opportunity to participate in the development of the Caspian Sea’s oil fields. Azerbaijan has become a political vassal of the West neither under the senior Aliyev, nor under the junior Aliyev who continues his father’s policy.
As to Armenia, the West had originally hopes to be able to attach it to itself by pro-Western president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan. However, the forced resignation of the latter put an end to those plans. Armenia owes too much to Russia in its history to ignore this fact, safely stored in people’s memories. Devoid of domestic energy resources, having an extremely unfavorable geographical position (the neighbors are Turkey and Azerbaijan), Armenia needed an alliance with Russia, with which, however, it had no boundaries, but for the aid of which it could hope for, particularly, due to the Russian military base on its territory. The strategic partnership between Moscow and Yerevan was established under President Robert Kocharian; it continues today, when the country is headed by Serzh Sargsyan. Armenia’s economy operates to a large extent due to Russian gas.
Thus, Armenia was not included in the orbit of Western influence. There remained only Georgia. And it is here that the West found what it had been looking for. Even President Gamsakhurdia did not hide his anti-Russian sentiments. It seemed that his successor as President, Eduard Shevardnadze, former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, and later, under Gorbachev, the Soviet foreign minister (as it turned out he betrayed the country’s interests on this high position) will change his predecessor’s course. However, in contrast to Aliyev, who showed both diplomatic flexibility and understanding of his country’s interests, Shevardnadze had forgotten what he is obliged to Moscow. Expressing desire to build partnerships with Russia, he actually looked increasingly to the West, where he met with full understanding.
The rise to power of Mikhail Saakashvili - outright creature of the West - put everything in its place. The cards were shown - Georgia rushed to embrace the West. However, it was not Georgia whose people have always had sympathy for Russia but its leadership led by Saakashvili. In Georgia, American military instructors appeared and began to train and rearm the Georgian army, which was rapidly replenished with the American military equipment. Cash flows from the west poured in Tbilisi – everything was done to permanently attach the country to it: Georgia was to become a bulwark of the West in the Caucasus.
Georgia, unlike Azerbaijan, was not rich in natural resources that could be harnessed for the West. But it had access to the Black Sea providing a link with Turkey, which was important for transporting fuel from Azerbaijan (the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline), and for implementing naval plans of the West. Moreover, Georgia was bordered by both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Russia (by the way, through this border during the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya, gang of Chechen militants penetrated into our country’s territory), and this was also taken into account by western politicians. So, the West needed the Georgian ‘card’ in its political game with Russia, it hoped to make good use of it.
But what did Georgia try to obtain in an alliance with the West, why was it so attractive to those who ran the policy of this former Soviet republic and now the sovereign country? Because you know it was possible to solve economic, in particular, energy issues, not only with the help of overseas ‘friends’ but with the assistance of the neighborhood Russia, especially as many Georgian businesses have been linked since the Soviet era by mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia. No, certainly the point was not in economic problems, but in purely political ones. Tbilisi apparently claimed a dominant role in the Caucasus, and, no doubt, this role had been promised to Georgian leadership by the West, who began to strengthen the local army.
Already Zviad Gamsakhurdia laid out course for the forcible retention of its autonomies within Georgia, unleashing a war in South Ossetia. Then it was the war in Abkhazia stopped by Moscow. This power politics became most outright in nature under Saakashvili. The war in South Ossetia unleashed by him in 2008 showed the world the true nature of his regime intentions. Of course, the West which had supported the Georgian aggressors bears responsibility as well for the bloodshed and many casualties of Saakashvili’s adventure.
Declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has become a logical consequence of the Georgian president’s actions and the war unleashed by him, meant the failure of Saakashvili’s attempts to retain by force these former autonomies, which have now acquired the coveted freedom. They are not so far recognized by the international community as independent states, but recognized by Russia, and this is a reliable safeguard against Saakashvili’s regime encroachment, who is unlikely to admit defeat.
And Saakashvili’s failures in domestic policy are obvious. The opposition to his regime is getting stronger. A growing number of political forces of different directions but united by one desire - to put an end at last to the failed regime - support the resignation of the current president of Georgia.
Saakashvili's regime is harshly criticized, for example, by the chairperson of the opposition People’s Assembly movement, ex-world chess champion Nona Gaprindashvili, who celebrated her 70th birthday in May and as before is very popular in Georgia. She opposes any compromise with Saakashavili who, in her opinion, has so compromised himself in the eyes of the people that he has the only thing to do – to resign, and as fast as possible.
Saakashvili’s failures in domestic and foreign policies have undermined his credibility on the part of the West, which can no longer pretend to be rapturous by the Georgian president’s activities. “Saakashvili messed up the mission of the Center,” say the Western media noting that “the idea of color revolutions has been finally compromised by Tbilisi’s regime.”
Saakashvili is trying to retrieve the situation scaring the West by Georgia’s possible return in the Russian sphere of influence. This, in his opinion, would have harmful effect for the West. The Transcaucasian region markets would be closed for the West, access to energy resources of Central Asia, and primarily to Turkmen gas, will be closed too.
But this attempt of political blackmail appears to be hardly successful. And the West is already looking for other less odious figure than Saakashvili in the capacity of head of Georgia until the opposition has proceeded to action. It remains to be seen whether the West will manage to find a reliable replacement for the discredited president, and most importantly - to keep Georgia in its orbit of influence. In any case, it is clear that the West is not going to lose Georgia as its Transcaucasian outpost.
