Question: It is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump will compare notes on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at their planned meeting at the G20 summit in Argentina's Buenos Aires. But what can be discussed there if the United States seems to have decided in principle to withdraw from INF Treaty?

Answer: I am not asserting but suggesting that it may deal with a rather high-level assurance that after quitting the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty the Americans will not be able to deploy such forces in Europe. It seems to me that we understand well after a meeting with U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton that the Americans will not turn back. The things are well past the sell-by date. Moreover, with the blessing of the Congress the United States has already started relevant research and development activities. So, the main task at the possible Putin-Trump negotiations is to preserve strategic stability in relations of Russia and the United States.

Question: Until the INF Treaty is in force, one can employ a mutual control mechanism. If there is no agreement, there is no control mechanism. What may then hinder the Americans from flooding Europe with intermediate-range nuclear forces?

Answer: Naturally, a political statement is not an agreement that provides for clear control instruments, but it is better than nothing. Moreover, I think that that no new agreement involving China, as Donald Trump wishes, is in sight, while a joint Russian-American political statement can be made.

Question: Obviously, any statement below the level of an agreement. However, there are different agreements. For example, there are mixed feelings about the INF Treaty in Russia. Some think that it is advantageous for us because the Americans removed their Pershing missiles from Europe, whose flying time to target was from eight to ten minutes. Others on the contrary say that Raegan outsmarted Gorbachev. Our ground-based intermediate-range missiles were scrapped, while sea- and air-launched missile systems (where the United States outnumbered the Soviet Union), have remained fully operational. And we made more reductions.

Answer: Indeed, the Americans destroyed 846 missiles, and we destroyed 1,846 – one thousand more. But the essence is not here. Intermediate-range missiles in Europe gave the Americans a possibility to cast what is called a decapitation strike allowing them to destroy command centers of the country and its armed forces.

And now if the United States returns its missiles to the European continent, while deploying the global missile defense system, a possibility of delivering a decapitation strike will become a reality. This means that the Americans will have an opportunity to defeat the major part of missiles deployed in the European part of our country and intercept the others on the flightpath with the missile defense system.

Question: But we have developed during this period Iskanders, Kalibrs and serious air-launched missile systems. Is not that a wake-up call?

Answer: Naturally, it is. But Kalibrs and Iskanders are not the only headache of the United States. They care not only about Europe, but also about the Pacific region, where China has created the so-called area denial system. Now American aircraft-carrying groups cannot approach the Chinese shore closer than two thousand kilometers, because they will get into the hitting area of Dongfeng-21D and Dongfeng-26 intermediate range ballistic missiles that were developed specially for the destruction of large naval targets with conventional self-guiding warheads.

Question: Do you think that China can easily push the button if the Americans cross the red line? And what would the consequences be?

Answer: Paradoxically, the more dangerous weapons you have, the less is a probability of an armed conflict.

Question: It is expected that the Americans will deploy missiles in Poland, Romania and in Baltic states. In turn, we will begin the mass production of ground-based intermediate-range missiles and thus we will get into a wearisome arms race, which is what the United States actually seeks. What can be our response in this situation?

Answer: Yars solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles are already in mass production, and there will be no big problem to make an intermediate-range missile.

If we leave just two stages of a three-stage Yars missile, it is exactly the missile we will get. But it seems to me that the main thing is to increase the production of hyper-sonic means in order to give an instantaneous response to the enemy.

Question: A retaliatory strike, is not it? Will we be able to respond, if the flight-in time is reduced to two or three minutes given that intermediate-range missiles are deployed near our borders? In this case the only hope is the Perimetr (Dead Hand, a system of automatic control over a mass retaliatory nuclear strike developed in the Soviet Union) and the retaliatory strike. Or has the Perimetr been already disassembled?

Answer: The Perimetr system is operational, and it has been even upgraded. But by the time it starts working, we will have little means. We will be able to launch only missiles that will survive the aggressor's first strike. But to be honest, we so far don't have an efficient response to American intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

If the Americans begin after all to deploy their missiles in Europe, there is nothing left for us but to give up the retaliatory strike strategy and switch to the preemptive strike strategy.

We are simply being pushed to this decision, as it is too dangerous for the country that American missile are deployed near Russian borders.

Question: Is not it the reason why John Bolton came to Moscow, to learn about our attitude to the New START Treaty?

Answer: According to available information, Bolton while at the Kremlin assured that the United States has no plans to deploy intermediate-range missile in Europe and that it is very much concerned about the misbalance in terms of these means with China in the Pacific region. The thing is that the Americans' accusing Russia of violating the INF Treaty, as one can imagine, is just a figure of speech in order to save the face and not to speak directly about China, which, as Washington thinks, should also be a party to the INF Treaty.

But the United States, as far as I know, is not going to withdraw from the New START Treaty before February 2021, but will discuss conditions of prolonging this treaty down to making adjustments to it, as Bolton said.

So, there will be no by-default prolongation of the New START Treaty. It will remain a topic for negotiations.

Question: ...President Trump said that the United States will improve and accumulate nuclear weapons, as financial capabilities allow for this option. But if we treat Trump's words literally this means that he de facto announced the withdrawal from the New START Treaty?

Answer: You know, although the budget of the United States has been growing, it is not a bottomless pit. Moreover, there is the Congress in the United States that enjoys considerable powers and has many times proved that Trump's wishes don't always match its capabilities. In any case the aspiration of the United States administration to build-up strategic offensive weapons will be hard to fulfill.

Question: At the same time, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that the Americans failed to complete the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty.

Answer: In fact they completed! Another case is that the U.S. technology of re-equipping some launchers aboard Ohio-class submarines so that to make it impossible to deploy submarine-launched ballistic missiles allows to rather swiftly reverse the operation. The same applies to B-52 heavy bombers that got the status of aircraft carrying solely non-nuclear weapons. But again this is a debating point. As to the number of deployed [strategic offensive] arms and the number of counted warheads, there is no doubt. Everything is according to the New START Treaty.

Question: Is the New START Treaty advantageous for us given the possible withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty?

Answer: Of course. Here we go, as of September 1, 2018 we had 517 deployed [strategic offensive] arms, the United States had much more, 659 units, but as of December 1, 2011 the United States had 822 deployed units. We are so far unable to reach the limit of 700 deployed units.

Now if the New START Treaty ceases to exist, the United States may for example have three rather that one warhead on each Minuteman III missile. And in Russia, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are full of warheads, and there is almost no breakout potential.

But one should keep in mind that the New START Treaty is important to the United States because it provides on-site inspections. This means they know what we do, and we know what they do. Recently, when Russia got the Avantgard missile system and the Sarmat missile system is about to come in, the issue of control has become rather important for the United States. They are going to deploy their new missile systems only after 2025, that is why it is advantageous for them to remain a party to the New START Treaty that may be extended up to February 2026 in order to have a possibility for on-site control of the deployment of our new missile systems.

Question: Has Vladimir Putin's address to the Federal Assembly, when he announced new Russian weapons, made that strong impression on Washington?

Answer: Of course, and not only the Avantgard and the Sarmat, but also the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon multi-purpose oceanic system. I have already said that the more dangerous weapons you have are, the less is the probability of an armed conflict.

Based on the article of "Zvezda" weekly