During a recent meeting with his colleagues at NATO headquarters in Brussels US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that Washington has stipulated a condition for Russia, giving it 60 days to return to compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, the US is going to leave the pact. Pompeo immediately explained what exactly should be done in this respect: the destruction of cruise missiles 9M729 (SSC-8 according to NATO classification). He claims that the mentioned missile has a range beyond the limit set by INF, namely 500 km, which poses a direct threat to Europe.

It is also interesting that NATO fully supported the US Secretary of State's statement and expressed readiness to vote in favor of a US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, and the European Union as represented by its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini vigorously opposed the agreement's denunciation. And this is despite the fact that the EU and NATO comprise nearly one and the same countries. Except Turkey, which is part of the North Atlantic Alliance but has no membership in the European Union, and EU members Finland and Sweden that are out of NATO.

As a matter of course, Moscow denied Mr. Pompeo's statement. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stressed that Moscow strictly adheres to the provisions of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This, by the way, has been repeatedly stated by our country's leadership, namely President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, who referred to American charges as faked-up, as well as leading domestic policy makers and experts. Moreover, many of them accused Washington of violating the terms of this treaty using Hera as target missiles to test its missile defense system, and those are in fact medium-range ones. Still further, the Aegis ballistic missile defense system located in Romania and deployed in Poland can launch not only SM-3 interceptors but also Tomahawk cruise missiles with an INF-prohibited range. When speaking on the issue Vladimir Putin said that the Pentagon budget had already included funds to create medium-range cruise missiles when the United States announced its withdrawal from the INF treaty, shifting the blame to the shoulders of our country.

For all the accusations between Moscow and Washington the issue of US withdrawal from the INF Treaty remains open and pending. Russia is naturally not going to react strongly against the US Secretary of State's ultimatum and destroy the 9M729 cruise missile which is designed for the Iskander-M ballistic missile system and by no means violates any INF provisions. Sergey Ryabkov emphasized that it has never been tested to its maximum range of 500 km. We aren't going to eliminate it both because it is beyond the scope of the agreement and because our country doesn't tolerate the language of ultimatums. If the United States is uncomfortable with this missile for whatever reason, there is a special mechanism to eliminate contradictions as regards the INF Treaty – the Special Verification Commission allowing to discuss reciprocal claims and forge proposals suitable for both parties.

For instance, retired Lieutenant General of the Russian Army and senior vice president of the Russian Center for Policy Studies (PIR center) Evgeny Buzhinsky proposed the following: Russia reduces the range of its 9m729 missile and the United States modifies its AegisAshore systems in Europe so that they can't launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. Other experts point to the possibility of on-site inspections: we would show the Americans our missile for the Iskander-M system, and they would demonstrate us the MK-41 launcher component of the Aegis system, so that each of us could check for any real violations of the INF Treaty. However, as your humble author learned, American politicians dismiss proposals of this kind right off the bat. They are not going to resolve contradictions around this agreement with Russia either at the negotiating table or by means of inspections. Moscow believes the political decision to withdraw from the INF treaty has been made long since and the American side is only going to maintain its ground.

The reason lies not only in the far-fetched issue of Russia's violation of the treaty. President Donald Trump has promised to provide the US military-industrial complex with new profitable orders, but really disturbing to Washington is China with its roughly 500 medium- and shorter-range missiles, as various sources claim. Those missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, pose a threat to US carrier strike groups in the Asia-Pacific region and bases in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Guam.

During a recent visit to Moscow, US President's national security advisor John Bolton promised our country's leadership that after leaving the INF Treaty the United States will not deploy its medium- and smaller-range missiles in Europe. He made similar claims both during his trip to European capitals concerned about Trump's decision to withdraw, and in the course of negotiations with the NATO leadership. But as the common folk say, "he that promises too much means nothing". Washington is not going to put this decision in black and white. For which reason expert of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe and former chief of staff of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (1994-1996) Colonel-General Viktor Yesin made a warning to the United States. If the sides fail to agree on the non-deployment of American missiles in Europe and Russian ones in the European part of the country, if Washington withdraws from the INF Treaty and starts deploying its medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, we may have to change nuclear conditions laid down in the military doctrine. Particularly to switch from the retaliatory strike policy to the pre-emptive strike one.

Another prominent Russian arms control expert, member of the Luxembourg forum Supervisory Council, Head of the Center for International Security at the  Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and a full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Alexei Arbatov said in a conversation with your humble author that we need to take time when making decisions on the US withdrawal from the INF treaty. There's a plenty of time, he believes. First, the real denunciation of the agreement will only come in six months after the official announcement is made, e.g. the Russian Foreign Ministry receives a relevant note from the US State Department. Second, we need to keep an eye on the United States' next step and choice of the deployment location for its medium- and shorter-range missiles. Americans will face monumental challenges in implementing their plans both in Europe and Asia.

South Korea, for all its readiness to cooperate with the United States, does not need this today. Seoul's overriding priority is to get along with Pyongyang, and the additional deployment of American missiles can cast a long shadow on this object. The Koreans will resist. The Japanese won't tolerate medium- and shorter-range missiles either. Especially if those are equipped with nuclear warheads. The country is also not going to exacerbate relations with China and Russia. The only place Washington can place its missiles without delay is Guam, which poses no real threat in our view. Only if American missiles appear in Europe – preparations for their deployment can always be easily traced thanks to pre-construction activities – we will be able to build up our missile potential in the European part of the country. We have this opportunity as represented by Kalibr cruise missiles able to effectively engage ground targets, strategic missile systems Yars  and Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx according to NATO classification) with one less stage, and even the same old 9M729 missiles that the Americans refer to as violating the INF Treaty. We will be able to increase their range if necessary.

According to the experts I interviewed, the main thing – after America's withdrawal from the INF Treaty, and this step seems obvious to Washington – is not to get involved in the nuclear arms race which is contraindicated for us in terms of economic and financial capabilities, but to have everything necessary and sufficient so that no one overseas gets tempted to challenge our military capacity. Judging by the atmosphere among the expert community, this kind of opinion prevails within the nation's leadership as well.