Detailed claims regarding Russia's compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty were for the first time voiced at the NATO summit in Brussels that took place early last week. "Allies have concluded that Russia has developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the INF Treaty and poses significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security," the statement adopted at the meeting reads. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that Russia should "return to full and verifiable compliance," otherwise the United States will pull out of it.

            The problem of the future of the Treaty is not military and technical details over which Moscow and Washington have been trading claims for several years. The possible withdrawal of the United States from the treaty is a step that stretches far beyond relations with Russia, and Washington is trying to solve several strategic tasks.

            1. The game surrounding the INF Treaty allows to start dismantling the system of restrictions imposed on the United States in the era of the Soviet-American confrontation at the accord of President Reagan. Washington undertook obligations to abandon the whole class of missiles in exchange for considerable military and technical concessions on behalf of its main rival. The Trump administration is trying by all means, including military ones, to keep America's leading positions in the long run. Although Russia's military strategic potential is still equal to America's, it is not the sole competitor in the military sphere. Some American security experts believe that a system of arms control agreements with Moscow is better than nothing. But the Trump administration assumes that any limitations imposed on the United States, just as on its possibly significant opponents, in a five- or seven-year term contradict its national interests.

            This approach is not new. The first step towards dismantling the system of restrictions inherited from the Cold War was made by President George W. Bush withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty is the second step. It is likely that the third step will follow, and the Russian-American New START Treaty that expires in 2021 will not be prolonged. Although the Nuclear Posture Review adopted in February says that the New START Treaty may be prolonged, the state of affairs of Russian-American relations leaves little chance for that. This does not mean that Washington will start boosting the number of its strategic warheads and launchers right in 2021. So far, the issue is only about modernizing the nuclear triad composed of strategic aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missile and strategic submarines. However, if there is no INF Treaty and no New START Treaty Americans will have their "hands untied" amidst the important tasks of simultaneous deterrence of Russia and China.

            The further change of the global military and political landscape will require Washington to revise its nuclear strategy and military plans in general, and many people in Washington perceive "untied hands" in the arms control sphere as the simplest and the most logical response. Some people are not honest enough to state this directly, but this has always been John Bolton's stance. It is logical that after he was appointed national security advisor this stance is turning into the official line.

            2. Trump's statement that the United States is ready to withdraw from the INF Treaty and the recent "ultimatum" of Mike Pompeo, who gave Russia 60 days to stop breaching the treaty is a new leveler that is needed to exert pressure simultaneously on Moscow, as well as on its European allies. Americans are trying to drive several wedges in relations between Russia and EU/NATO. Although a number of European leaders and many representatives of European elite did not like the decision of the Trump administration to abandon "the obsolete treaty," the United States has continued to pursue its line at the NATO summit in Brussels. And again, many people in Western European capitals and even at the level of the European Union did not like it. But the position stated in the statement of NATO foreign ministers on the INF Treaty prove that the United States managed to force through its line.

            "The ultimatum" voiced by Pompeo, which is formally a delay of United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty and courtesy towards Berlin and Paris, in fact is just a tool of shifting blame for ruining the treaty to Moscow. It turns out that Americans withdraw from the treaty because Russia refuse to comply with it rather than because of their own will. Moscow is put in a defensive position which is knowingly losing. Any attempt to prove that Moscow did not breach the treaty could be doubted, any Russia's harsh statement, and inevitable political statements and military measures after the American withdraws will also be interpreted as "aggressive intentions" with regard to Europe.

            There will be voiced heard in the European Union that will echo this Washington's song. And it will be easier to convince the allies to spend more money on defense. It will be easier to explain to American taxpayers and European elites that ambitious and expensive missile defense system of the United States/NATO need to be built. A hypothetical threat posed by Russia's ground-launched intermediate-range missile, which do not exist in reality so far, will allow to justify any plans and expenditures on deploying missile defense elements. The hypothetical Iranian threat was not clearly enough for that end. It is telling that the Trump administration delayed the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and has not so far outlined its vision of the system's future. There are reasons to believe that the dismantlement of the INF Treaty will allow to return to the traditional Republican line aimed at the large-scale development of missile defense in the European and what is more important the Asian Pacific theater of operations.

            The dismantlement of the INF Treaty and Russia's response allow Americans to get green light from at least a part of its allies to deploy ground-launched offensive means. This long-run scenario will not only kill Moscow's attempts to develop dialogue with Western European members of NATO on the creation of a new architecture of European security but also will allow the United States to create additional barriers to the development of political and economic ties between Russia and the EU, including in the energy sphere.

            3. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty will allow the United States to start deploying intermediate-range missiles in the Asian Pacific region, primarily in its allies, Japan and Australia. This will allow to add means of regional significance to strategic offensive arms ensuring deterrence of China. They comply with the tasks of countering China's potential a major part of which consists of intermediate-range missiles.

            But political effect not only on the regional level that may be secured is much more important for Washington. The idea that the American withdrawal from the INF Treaty has little to do with the European theater of operations but is directed at getting additional tools for deterring China was staffed in during Bolton's visit to Moscow. This is how the Trump administration tested the waters, whether Russia will agree to a scenario in which the withdrawal from the INF Treaty does not affect the situation in Europe. It is likely that this line will further be developed. Many people in Washington understand that the simultaneous deterrence of Russia and China amidst growing tensions with both powers is a very difficult and rather expensive military and political task.