On January 17, US President Donald Trump set forth a revised strategy on development and use of the US global anti-missile system named ‘Missile Defense Review’ at the Pentagon, where he outlined the main priorities of the current administration in that field taking into account the new “threats” of using ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as hypersonic systems. The American military and political officials believe that such “threats” allegedly stem from Russia and the People’s Republic of China, as well as from Iran and DPRK to a lesser extent.
The new 100-page strategy superseded a similar anti-missile plan greenlighted by former president Barack Obama in 2010, though maintained its global deployment pattern, mainly due to installation of up to 95% of interceptors in the global ocean. The updated strategy mirrored the specific anti-Russia, anti-China, anti-Iran, and anti-North Korea focus, and even went beyond the mentioned nine-year-old document on a whole number of quantity and quality parameters.
Strategy ‘January 17’ is fully integrated with the national strategies approved by the present administration earlier, such as ‘National Security Strategy’, ‘National Defense Strategy’ and ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ of the country that were adopted at the end of 2017 or the beginning of 2018. Consequently, the new anti-missile strategy completely plays into the ‘Chicago triad’, which comprised an integrated strategic mechanism of nuclear missile, anti-missile and conventional arms of the US and NATO brought together at the summit of the North Atlantic alliance in Chicago in May 2012.
The opinion of a raft of experts that the new US anti-missile policy only focuses on nuclear missile deterrence of their potential adversaries rather than on boosting anti-missile potentials against them, contradicts the reality, since it envisions the development of all existing and projected anti-missile systems.
In his speech, Donald Trump admitted that in accordance with the endorsed document the American anti-missile ‘shield’ is aimed at detecting and destroying any missile launched against the United States, “anywhere, anytime, any place.” The deployment of additional striking elements of strategic anti-missile system in forward-based units, as well as in the country’s continental part – in Alaska and California where the total number of strategic ground-based interceptors will rise from 44 (40 units in the former case and 4 – in the latter) to 64 units, or an around 1.5-fold increase from the current level, was particularly highlighted. In an effort to increase the efficiency of those ground-based interceptors, a missile capable of carrying multiple warheads will be developed.
A special emphasis was placed on boosting the reserves of currently most efficient land- and sea-based interceptors of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA type. The Pentagon is facing the task of testing that anti-missile system to intercept intercontinental missiles by 2020. For reference, a target missile of that range has been already successfully intercepted by the US Navy and the Pentagon’s missile defense agency.
The total number of land-based interceptors deployed on the territory of the US and other foreign countries will rise. Particularly, the US missile facility in Romania will remain operational, where it is on high alert, as well as the one in Poland, which is under construction. The potential of sea-based interceptor missiles installed on cruisers and torpedo boat destroyers of certain types will rise substantially: from 38 now to already 60 by 2023, and to 84 and even 96 by 2042-2043.
The space-based missile attack warning facility serving the interests of global anti-missile infrastructure will be fortified, the work to create space strike weapons and antisatellite weapons will continue. The plans to use heavy unmanned aerial vehicles for delivering interceptors and even F-35 multipurpose fight plane were revealed. The charter on development of hypersonic systems’ interceptors has become an innovative concept of Donald Trump’s updated anti-missile strategy.
The US’ anti-missile strategy of 2019 stipulates elimination of ballistic and cruise missiles not only at various stages of their flight, but also on the ground, meaning prior to the launch. There was no such provision in the anti-missile strategy nine years ago.
The Republican administration has no plans to cut spending on development and deployment of the global anti-missile system. For 2019 financial year, the Congress earmarked $11.3 bln on those purposes, an increase of $1.4 bln compared to the previous year. Add to that $4 bln allocated for strengthening the US’ anti-missile infrastructure against the “ballistic missile threat” of North Korea.
Overall, the administration of sitting 45th President of the US annually spends roughly one and a half as much funds compared with the Democratic Barack Obama. Additional allocations of the current administration have been spent on development of traditional interceptors of ballistic and cruise missiles ($126 mln), development of anti-missile laser weapons ($85 mln) and creation of interceptors for hypersonic systems of potential adversaries ($46 mln). When presenting the document, Donald Trump also urged his allies to share expenses on development of the global anti-missile defense infrastructure with the United States.
In a move to play down the disruptive mission of the new strategy of anti-missile system development, the Pentagon’s officials have been quick to soothe the US and global public, claiming that the approved document does not mean that the US should be considered as joining the arms race. However, that is the case, since they personally initiated such a race particularly in the anti-missile field when on a unilateral basis withdrew from ABM Treaty in 2002, and announced an ambitious ‘European Phased Adaptive Approach’ to the issue of anti-missile defense in 2009, which has been extended until 2022.
What stands out is the fact that the release of the new ‘Missile Defense Review’ on January 17 coincided with the statements of high-ranked representatives of the US State Department made on the previous day, on January 16, about the US side’s “suspension of the INF” and its withdrawal six months after the starting point on February 2, meaning in August. That suggests that American partners will continue destroying the system of treaties on arms control. Washington is reluctant to revive the anti-missile agreement in any form and is adamantly opposed to discussing the anti-missile issue with any side. Donald Trump was clear about that during the presentation of his adjusted anti-missile strategy.
Taking into account the mentioned circumstances, a private US research organization ‘Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’ referred to the revised strategy as an “expensive and destabilizing” policy that it expects will trigger “a potentially dangerous expansion of anti-missile weapons.”
Concurrently, the US expert society is concerned about the fact that Moscow and Beijing will definitely respond to the ‘Missile Defense Review’ by both strengthening and upgrading its nuclear missile potential and development of facilities to suppress the American and NATO anti-missile ‘shield’. Both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have every right to that not only due to the specifics of the new US anti-missile strategy, but considering the creation of a brand-new strategic nuclear triad in the United States, its withdrawal from the INF Treaty and a number of its violations of the New START Treaty.
Taking into consideration the US’ new anti-missile line and a whole number of other military and political actions made by Washington on the global arena, one should not jump to stating that Moscow is ready to decide positively on extension of the New START Treaty that expires in February 2021, for another five years.
It would not be right to automatically, only due to certain temporary factors, reduce Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons and precise hypersonic systems amid the growth of US striking power specifically targeted at intercepting them, with simultaneous real boosting of the potential of US strategic and tactical missile nuclear weapons.
