Global contest for diesel: “Mad Max” turns real

In the cult 1979 film “Mad Max,” civilization collapses not from nuclear war or a pandemic, but from a mundane fuel shortage. Gangs fight over the last canisters of gasoline, the police are neutralized, and society spirals into chaos.

Almost half a century later, this plot is ceasing to be science fiction. The global diesel fuel market — the global economy’s “workhorse” — has entered a phase of acute shortage, and the major powers are beginning to act under a logic well familiar to viewers of post-apocalyptic action films: save themselves, without thinking about consequences for others.

Diesel fuel powers freight transport, agriculture, construction, mining, and electricity generation. Its shortage strikes across a broad spectrum — from food deliveries to supermarkets to the operation of farmer combines. That is precisely why the current deficit affects the global economy more strongly than a shortage of crude oil. As Joe DeLaura, senior energy strategist at Rabobank, put it, “oil is just a raw material, but diesel is everything that an industrial economy runs on.”

The causes of the crisis are multilayered. The war with Iran unleashed by the US in late February disabled a significant portion of the Persian Gulf’s refining capacity. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Washington’s military bases in the location also damaged refineries in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain, which knocked out about 2.8 million barrels per day of refining capacity — a critical source of diesel for Europe. The East — West pipeline, through which Saudi oil flowed to the Red Sea, was attacked by drones in September and put out of operation, depriving Europe of yet another supply channel. The Yemeni Houthis claimed that the blowing up of the pipe was their operation.

In parallel, Russia, which is part of the pool of leading global diesel exporters, imposed an export ban after a wave of attacks by Ukrainian UAVs on its refineries. If before the restrictions Moscow supplied about 10 percent of global seaborne diesel deliveries, now those volumes have disappeared from the market. Europe, having lost both Russian and Middle Eastern barrels, rushed to buy American diesel — and found itself dependent on Washington, which now threatens to shut off this channel.

At the same time, the diesel crisis in the US has its own specifics. Diesel prices reached a record $6.5 per gallon versus $2.8 a year earlier. The average gasoline price rose in the autumn to $4.4. For the American voter, who votes not for geopolitical concepts but for the affordability of fuel, this is a direct challenge. And Trump does clearly understand this.

On September 22, the US leader publicly supported the idea of banning diesel exports. "Let’s not send diesel [abroad]," he told journalists. The very next day, Politico reported that the administration was preparing a plan for a 90-day ban. The White House called this "fake news," but September 27 saw Trump confirm that he was studying this possibility "very seriously."

Washington’s logic is utterly frank. One oil executive familiar with the course of the discussions formulated it as follows: "The President considers any consequences of the ban a ‘December problem.’" In other words, Trump is not worried about what will happen to the world market after the November 3 election, but about what will happen to his party before it. The midterm elections to Congress are, in essence, a referendum of confidence in the president, and rising fuel prices hit Republicans in the most vulnerable states. 

Another Politico source described the balance of forces in the administration even more harshly: "What outweighed the voices of sensible people in the White House was the faction that shouts: ‘Prices at the pumps are collapsing, something must be done!’"

Thus, electoral logic has displaced strategic logic. Trump is ready to risk relations with allies, if only his voter sees numbers on the gas station scoreboard that suit him.

For Europe, an American ban is a catastrophe. The US is the largest exporter of diesel in the world, accounting for about 20 percent of global seaborne trade in this fuel. In August, Europe imported about half a million barrels per day of American diesel, which amounted to more than half of the EU’s entire imports. The largest economies of the commonwealth — Germany, France, Italy — depend on these deliveries.

Things are aggravated by the fact that Europe itself has consistently been reducing its own refining capacity. From 2009 to 2024, several dozen oil refineries closed in the EU, with their retiring capacity estimated at 20 percent. In 2024, 60 percent of the closed capacity fell specifically on diesel units — Brussels, carried away by the “green transition,” did not notice how it undermined its own energy base.

Now European officials are negotiating with the Trump administration, trying to prevent the ban. The European Commission warned that “any additional restrictions on fuel supplies to the EU could quickly lead to very serious consequences.” Eugene Lindell, Director of Oil Products Market Analysis at the consulting company FGE NexantECA, directly calls the introduction of the ban a “genuine catastrophe” for the world market, predicting prices soaring to $350 per barrel. Compare: diesel is currently trading at about $200 per barrel.

Yet Europe has no real leverage over Washington. The irony is that a year ago Trump threatened Europe with tariffs unless it bought more American energy. Now he is threatening to shut off diesel supplies that have become vital to Europe.

While for Europe an American ban is a catastrophe, for Latin America it is an existential threat. The key three buyers of American diesel at the end of 2025 look like this: Mexico, Chile, and Brazil. It is precisely these three countries that form the key demand for American distillate in the Western Hemisphere, and it is precisely they who will find themselves in the most vulnerable position if the ban is introduced.

According to EIA data, Mexico in 2025 was the largest buyer with a figure of about 220 thousand barrels per day (17 percent of all US exports). Chile took second place, increasing deliveries by about 15 percent as compared with 2024 — for this country, American diesel is critical, since it ensures the operation of the mining industry, and Chile together with Peru cover more than a third of world copper production. Brazil closed the top three: in 2025, deliveries averaged 103 thousand barrels per day, which is twice more than a year earlier.

However, in September 2026 the alignment changed: Brazil took first place among buyers of American diesel, overtaking Mexico. The reason is a seasonal factor: the sowing season began in the country, and demand for diesel for agricultural machinery rose sharply. According to Kpler and Vortexa, about 80 percent of all diesel imports into Brazil in September came specifically from the US. Mexico, which had retained leadership at the end of 2025, found itself second, followed by Chile, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The vulnerability of these countries is critical. Chile depends on the US for 88 percent of its diesel imports. Ecuador imports more than 80 percent of its diesel from the US. In Mexico, diesel reserves in April 2026 fell below six days of consumption. S&P Global analysts directly warn: "given the shortage of free refining capacity in Latin America, the sudden and complete loss of American diesel will likely cause a sharp rise in prices and costs for consumers and business." Replacing American barrels will purchases from India in the Middle East, and this process will take time and raise costs.

Amid the American diesel ultimatum, one has to understand that Russia, too, is restricting exports of its own diesel — but with a different logic and different timelines. According to Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. of August 28, 2026, the ban on the export of diesel fuel for direct producers is in effect until September 30, 2026 inclusive. For non-producers (traders), the restrictions have been extended until January 31, 2027.

However, business media report longer timelines. Vedomosti and RBK wrote on September 15, citing sources, that a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak on September 14 witnessed a decision to extend the ban for producers until the end of October 2026. At the same time, the relevant resolution had not been published on the government.ru portal at the time the news came out — that is, this is a decision that has not yet been enshrined in an official document.

Thus, a double uncertainty is taking shape on the diesel market: on the one hand, Trump is threatening a ban on exports of American diesel, on the other — Russia itself is restricting supplies, and the final timelines of this restriction do not yet have published legal confirmation. For Europe and Latin America, which have lost both Russian and Saudi volumes, this means that the search for alternative sources of diesel is becoming an increasingly difficult task — and it is precisely when Washington is planning to shut off yet another supply channel — its own one.

The diesel crisis is not simply a seasonal problem. It is a structural shift that is reshaping global logistics. The US is the leader on the world diesel market. The departure of American volumes means that Europe, Latin America, and Asia will compete for the remaining barrels, driving prices through the roof. Analysts already note that diesel prices in Europe could soar to $350 if the ban is introduced.

For Russia and other suppliers, this creates an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the European and Latin American niches are being freed up — but Moscow itself has restricted diesel exports. On the other hand, China, actively increasing purchases of Russian energy resources, is diversifying sources, reducing dependence on Western routes. The energy map of the world is being redrawn, and in this new world, logistical autonomy is becoming more important than the momentary price.

So, Trump has found himself in the trap of his own policy. The war with Iran, which he began in February, provoked the diesel crisis — and now he has to choose between saving the voter and preserving allied relations. Electoral logic takes the upper hand: there is a little more than a month left before the elections, and the “December problem” seems to him less important than the November result. Europe, deprived of Russian and Middle Eastern supplies, and Latin America, dependent on American diesel for 80-88 percent, find themselves hostages of the American decision. And the world diesel market, already on the brink, could collapse into an abyss from which there is no exit without a settlement of the Middle East conflict. The “Mad Max” blockbuster was science fiction. Today it is becoming a kind of guide to action — and this, to put it mildly, is not the most encouraging scenario for the world fuel market.