Moscow
18 November 2026 / 02:08
Moscow
18 November 2026 / 02:08
Котировки
USD
18/11
currency
82.4529
0.0000
EUR
18/11
currency
90.8136
0.0000
Economy

Trump's energy diplomacy is becoming a set of frozen initiatives

US energy policy after the midterms

Trump's energy diplomacy is becoming a set of frozen initiatives Trump's energy diplomacy is becoming a set of frozen initiatives

What the 2026 midterms changed was less the balance of forces in Washington than the speed at which the executive branch can carry out its foreign policy agenda. The transition does not formally end until January 3, 2027, when the new Congress takes up its work; until then the Trump administration keeps its hold on the executive levers, but the political price of every step concerning with Russia or the Middle East is already climbing sharply. Energy policy, in this regard, is no mere industry topic but a litmus test of a wider shift: the United States is moving from actively shaping global energy flows to trying to hold what it already has.

What the 2026 midterms changed was less the balance of forces in Washington than the speed at which the executive branch can carry out its foreign policy agenda. The transition does not formally end until January 3, 2027, when the new Congress takes up its work; until then the Trump administration keeps its hold on the executive levers, but the political price of every step concerning with Russia or the Middle East is already climbing sharply. Energy policy, in this regard, is no mere industry topic but a litmus test of a wider shift: the United States is moving from actively shaping global energy flows to trying to hold what it already has.

The most telling indicator of how the elections changed the White House's rhetoric was things around Iran. Not long ago Trump was threatening a "devastating strike" on Iranian nuclear facilities, and his advisers openly discussed resuming bombardments. Right after the vote, however, the tone changed sharply. Trump said he was "in no hurry" with a decision on new attacks, noting that "Iran wants a deal, and it could happen." He also boasted of a fall in oil prices of nearly $10 a barrel, explaining it so: the market had come to believe in the absence of war. Behind this reversal there is pure electoral arithmetic: voters are tired of inflation and rising fuel prices, and a new Middle East escalation would be political suicide for the Republicans. Vice-President Vance and special envoy Witkoff are insisting on following the diplomatic track, and Trump appears inclined to "save face" by concluding a deal with Tehran against the backdrop of Iran's weakened economy. In geopolitical terms this means that Washington is temporarily abandoning forceful pressure in a region that remains key to global energy flows and handing the initiative to other players, including Moscow and Beijing.

The fate of the Russian diesel agreement of October 9 also became a graphic illustration of how political changes in Washington are transmitted into logistics. Two tankers heading for American ports, according to the FT, changed course: one set a heading for Brazil, the other for the Mediterranean. Formally the administration retains the right to issue permits, but the governor of New Jersey threatened operators with fines even before the elections, and Democrats in the House warned oil companies in advance of criminal liability. As a result, the corporate sector itself became a filter, cutting off risky deals even if they are authorized by the executive branch. A deal conceived as a quick political gesture turned into a logistical puzzle in which the main constraint was not Moscow's position but American business's fear of investigations. To Russia this is a signal: to negotiate with an administration that cannot guarantee the implementation even of its own decisions is pointless — firm institutional guarantees are needed, and those are now ever harder for Trump to provide.

In parallel, the US is advancing two interconnected initiatives that were supposed to become part of a broader deal on an energy truce. The first is the resumption of Russian gas supplies to Europe through the Ukrainian pipe with sale through an American intermediary. The second is the attraction of an American investor to the Nord Stream project. Both initiatives run into the same problem: they either the lifting of sanctions, which is possible by executive decision but politically toxic, or the tacit consent of Congress, which after the elections has become almost impossible. On November 2, Russian president's press secretary Dmitry Peskov gave an extremely clear signal: "The situation on the ground speaks more than eloquently to the impossibility of implementing such plans at present." In other words, even if the administration retains the technical ability to act, the absence of an institutional foundation makes these schemes thin-spun. In a broad reading, this undermines Trump's geopolitical strategy, which was partly built on the attempt to turn energy flows into an instrument of reconciliation with Moscow — now that mechanism is blocked.  

The most difficult to understand — and the most telling for the fate of the Russian-American energy dialogue — remains the Alaskan story, where two fundamentally different projects coexist.

The first, Alaska LNG, promoted personally by Trump through the Glenfarne Group, provides for building a pipeline around 1,300 km long from the North Slope to the southern coast and a plant with a capacity of 20 million tons a year; its estimate is put at $44.5-54.5 billion, and with due regard to risks it could rise to $65-100 billion, while first deliveries are expected no earlier than in 2031. It is precisely this project that the administration is trying to attract Japanese and South Korean investment into, but Seoul and Tokyo have not yet confirmed engagement, citing the need to verify commercial feasibility: the South Korean government has commissioned an independent assessment of the project from an outside consulting firm, while Tokyo, according to Business Korea, emphasizes the role of an LNG buyer rather than a direct investor, although preliminary purchase agreements with buyers from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have already been signed.

The second, Polar Train LNG, created in March 2026, dispenses with the pipeline: gas from the Prudhoe Bay field is fed through a short pipe to a modular gravity-based platform in shallow water, where it is liquefied and shipped onto icebreaking LNG carriers. The capacity of the first phase is 7 million tons a year, the cost $8-9 billion, the launch in 2029-2030, with potential expansion to 21 million tons and a total cost of around $25 billion. The key feature of Polar LNG is that it is built on associated gas from Prudhoe Bay, which today in a volume of around 28 million cubic meters a day is pumped back into the reservoir to maintain pressure and oil recovery. Any withdrawal of this gas for export creates a risk for oil production at a field in the late stage of development — and this is what makes the project vulnerable not so much politically as in resource terms: it comes into direct contradiction with interests of the oilmen, for whom the "gas caps" are not raw material for export but a condition for sustaining the extraction of "black gold."

The connection with Russia relates precisely to Polar Train LNG and became the subject of investigations by the Financial Times and The New York Times in late October 2026. According to the outlets, the project from the very outset considered buying out a partially built gravity platform originally created for the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2. Ex-CEO of Polar Train LNG Joel Riddle stated that NOVATEK secretly financed the project and determined its strategy until permits were obtained from the US Treasury, after which almost the entire management of the company left the project. NOVATEK denies this, asserting that it granted the right to use the technologies of the Tech Wave Industrial Projects Management company (Abu Dhabi) and signed a memorandum with Polar Train in April, when Riddle was still running the company.  

To implement the project, NOVATEK stresses, permits from the Russian and US authorities are required. Notably, Riddle initially considered the project's investor to be Gentry Beach — a university friend of Trump Jr. — but it later emerged that Beach had not invested in the project and is not a shareholder. This story lends the project additional political fragility: it turns out to be embedded in a network of personal connections around the Trump family, which makes it all the more vulnerable to investigations and criticism from the Democrats, especially after their election victory.

As for Moscow, the institutional deadlock in Washington objectively works in its favor. The Trump administration would like to preserve channels of dialogue and restore economic ties, as evidenced by both the Alaskan track and elaboration of other economic rapprochement directions. After the midterms, however, the price of any step toward Moscow has soared. Russia gains time that Washington no longer has, and can afford not to hurry with a response to American schemes. Arctic projects, Turkish Stream, and redirection of flows to Asia remain a more reliable support for Moscow than fragile arrangements with an administration whose legislative possibilities may be blocked by its opponents.  

Thus, Trump's energy policy after the midterm elections is entering a phase of institutional blocking: initiatives not backed by legislative support are either frozen or become encrusted with risks that make them unrealizable. The Iranian reversal from escalation to negotiations, the change of course by the diesel tankers, and the ephemerality of gas schemes with Ukrainian transit demonstrate that the corporate sector and electoral constraints have become independent political filters, cutting off even projects authorized by the executive branch. The Alaskan thing adds a technological and personal dimension to the picture: the Polar LNG project, conceived as a quick and cheap way around Alaska LNG issues, has proved vulnerable both politically and even physically as it is built on gas that today performs the work of sustaining reservoir oil recovery at the Prudhoe Bay field, and it requires an engineering solution that does not yet exist. The Russian trace in this project — from the buyout of the Arctic LNG 2 platform to accusations of secret financing and engagement of Gentry Beach — shows how deeply commercial interests have become interwoven with sanctions policy and personal connections, and how fragile this knot proves to be when the political cycle changes direction. LNG expansion remains the only active track, but its sustainability depends on whether Washington can offer its partners the predictability that it itself currently lacks.

  • new_top