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Politics

Ukraine: time to talk about what really matters

The Ukraine settlement has outgrown the Moscow-Kiev format and become a dispute over how Europe's balance should be built

Ukraine: time to talk about what really matters Ukraine: time to talk about what really matters

Just a reminder: a week ago, the Emirati capital hosted a meeting between the Russian, US, and Ukrainian delegations. The Europeans were not there — they came to the UAE but were not allowed to take part. Vladimir Medinsky, who headed the Russian delegation, framed the central discussion theme as follows: not only ending the conflict but building \"a new, modern Yalta and Potsdam\" — a security system \"imbued with the spirit of Helsinki 1975.\" Such a system, he said, could secure peace in Europe \"for decades, and perhaps even centuries.\"

Just a reminder: a week ago, the Emirati capital hosted a meeting between the Russian, US, and Ukrainian delegations. The Europeans were not there — they came to the UAE but were not allowed to take part. Vladimir Medinsky, who headed the Russian delegation, framed the central discussion theme as follows: not only ending the conflict but building "a new, modern Yalta and Potsdam" — a security system "imbued with the spirit of Helsinki 1975." Such a system, he said, could secure peace in Europe "for decades, and perhaps even centuries."

The next day, November 12, saw US presidential special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner flow to Moscow, where Putin received them for the eighth time. The American emissaries, according to media reports, themselves raised the topic of pan-European security: "We began discussing what the architecture will look like that will not only end this conflict but also prevent a new one from starting." For Brussels this sudden linkage of "peace over Ukraine plus a remaking of Europe" came as a surprise: as the Financial Times wrote, Kushner's proposal caught the Europeans off guard, and the US inadvertently gave Moscow a lever of pressure both on the Kiev regime and on NATO.

The contents of the Russian position became known from an unofficial document dated November 10, described by The New York Times. According to the newspaper, the demands largely repeat the December 2021 drafts, but some formulations are tougher: NATO's renunciation of further enlargement and military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; the rollback of the alliance's bases in countries that joined it after 1997; the cessation of arms supplies to Kiev; the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU — but with no engagement in its common defense policy; Paris's and London's renunciation of the "nuclear umbrella" for the protection of other European countries. Russian negotiators in Abu Dhabi, as The New York Times wrote, called the document merely a starting position, stressing that Putin was "ready to show flexibility."

Separate points — Finland's withdrawal from NATO, demilitarization of the Odessa and Nikolayev ports, federalization of Moldova — journalists of another European outlet, Bild, also attribute to Moscow, but the Russian side neither confirms nor comments on these reports. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after the Americans' meeting with Zelensky, gave the following assessment of the Russian demands: "They are unacceptable not only to Ukraine but above all to Europe — and certainly to countries like Poland."

On November 11, the Moscow forum on collective security saw director of the Foreign Ministry's department of foreign policy planning Alexei Drobinin also outline more flexible forms of relationship: from bilateral non-aggression agreements with individual NATO countries to mutual assistance unions — following the pattern of Moscow's treaties with Minsk and Pyongyang.

One of the wishes Russia puts forward to Europe for its inclusion in the existing negotiating formats is designation of a single negotiator. At the informal summit of the European Political Community in Dublin on November 12-13, the Europeans (unsuccessfully) tried to agree on who would speak on their behalf. Head of European diplomacy Kaja Kallas was publicly not admitted to the negotiating group: President of the European Council António Costa and head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced a delegation without her.

In the end, Europe is to be represented by a complex construction of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and EU institutions in the next round — hardly something that can be called a genuinely single negotiator. At the same summit von der Leyen formulated a double formula: "maximum support for Ukraine — maximum pressure on Russia." And on November 9, before Dublin, she set out a red line: a new security architecture will not be discussed until a ceasefire.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, for his part, rejects the very framing of the question: "We do not need to discuss this; the European security architecture does already exist." At the same time Berlin has reportedly allowed for a personal meeting between Merz and Putin after Abu Dhabi — a soft signal amid harsh rhetoric.

And Emmanuel Macron took a step away from Brussels' common line on November 15: on X he stated that Ukraine "has every ground" to take its "legitimate place" in NATO, called it the largest land army in Europe, and urged the allies to decide what they see Europe as being after a settlement and what exactly they expect from the United States as regards security. Let us note: this is a position rather of "including Kiev in the existing system" than of "building a new one" — but it diverges from Berlin and Washington's caution as they have so far excluded Ukraine's accession to the alliance from the agenda.

On Monday, the EU Foreign Affairs Council met in Brussels and worked on three fronts at once. The ministers approved 145 new sanctions listings — refineries, 47 banks, and an oil terminal in St. Petersburg made it onto the lists; Kallas promised to present the 22nd package of restrictions "in the coming days." At the same time the EU provided Kiev with the largest tranche since 2022 — almost eight billion euros under the Ukraine Facility program, of which around five billion is a loan.

And, finally, Kallas herself announced that along with the ministers a document had already been prepared with "maximum demands" — a list of concessions Russia must make before negotiations can continue; for the next round in Abu Dhabi the ministers will prepare a mandate for the European negotiating group.

She called Moscow's demands "maximal and genuinely absurd," stressing that Russia was repeating the 2021 rhetoric while merely adding new ones. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul spoke in the same vein: "However loudly Putin may try to steer the discussion in the direction he wants, we will stick to our course." Some ministers (mostly from the small Eastern European countries) proposed not agreeing at all to discuss the security architecture with Moscow before a ceasefire in the Special Military Operation zone, and Lithuanian foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys called this outright a "trap." Estonian prime minister Kristen Michal went further, doubting that Europe should be at the table at all: mediation would mean abandoning sanctions.

The picture of assessments is perhaps most accurately conveyed by the headlines themselves. Politico came out with the text "Putin won at the Abu Dhabi talks" and the observation that Moscow's red lines had shifted not one iota. The Financial Times saw in the expanded agenda a "Pandora's box": the longer the "security architecture" is discussed, the more cracks appear in NATO's foundation. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung noted the irony of things: the EU has won the right to participate in the talks but does not know whom to entrust with the dialogue with Moscow. The NYT writes that Moscow wants to return Europe to the Cold War model of divided spheres of influence. Britain’s UnHerd warned of the opposite: if the Euro trio — Berlin, Paris, and London — sticks to its previous agreements, there will be no accord with Moscow at all.

It must be said that the Kremlin itself does not strive to drag the Europeans to the negotiating table at any cost. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov formulated another condition, besides a single negotiator: the question of the EU's engagement will arise when Europe comes up with substantive settlement proposals. Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov was even sharper on November 17: "Their position is of such a pronounced non-peaceful character… With such a position it is hardly possible to claim any significant place" at the table. Russian representatives at the same time recalled that our country has so far received not a single peace initiative, not a single specific peace proposal from the European countries.

The next round of trilateral talks, according to Ushakov, will take place in Abu Dhabi; the Europeans are preparing their mandate for it, while Washington, according to Bloomberg, on the contrary wants to discuss European security in parallel with the settlement, which so far diverges from Brussels' position. The divergence that has so far gone nowhere: Moscow insists first on a common framework, Europe first on a ceasefire. Until the next round this problem is unlikely to be resolved.

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