Brussels: Sanctions against Russia, with Trump in mind
EU sanction packages look increasingly like ritual gestures
12 October 2026I saw EU foreign ministers approve the 22nd package of anti-Russian sanctions in Luxembourg. Kaya Kallas, the bloc's top diplomat, called it the "most sweeping" throughout the conflict between Russian and Ukraine — and formally, the numbers comply: some 1,600 entries have been added, 743 individuals and 826 legal entities, a 50-percent expansion of the existing register. But the gesture is louder than the blow. Against the Russian economy it lands softly; against the facade of Western unity, it lands hard. And its real addressee is not Moscow. It is Washington.
The backstory of the hasty decision lies not in Brussels but in Washington. On October 9, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin agreed on a deal under which the US temporarily removed Russian diesel fuel from sanctions. The US Treasury issued General License No. 135, permitting supplies of Russian diesel to the world market until April 7, 2027. In response, Moscow lifted its own ban on diesel exports ahead of schedule.
Brussels' reaction was instantaneous. As early as October 10, Kaya Kallas declared: "The suspension of sanctions on Russian diesel fuel will provide Moscow with even more revenue." In her view, such actions by Washington are unacceptable, since financial proceeds from the sale of energy resources "contribute to strengthening the Russian Federation’s defense potential." The 22nd package became a direct response to what Brussels perceived as a betrayal of Western unity.
The package focuses on the defense-industrial complex. More than half of the new entries are linked to producing ballistic missiles, with the remainder tied to suppliers of dual-use goods. For individuals, this means a ban on entry and assets freezing; for companies, a complete prohibition on interaction with European residents.
Energy sanctions, however, are virtually absent from the package. As a source familiar with the contents of the document plainly states: there are no new sanctions against oil, gas, or banks in the package — since April, the EU has still not reached consensus on a full ban on maritime services for tankers carrying Russian oil. This measure, which the European Commission has been trying to advance since the 20th package, remains in limbo due to the position of Greece, Malta, and other ship-owning states.
The sole energy-related subject around which a struggle unfolded was Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). It was expected that the 22nd package would include sanctions against 14 Arc7 ice-class tankers servicing the Yamal LNG project, as well as a ban on European ports and shipyards servicing them. According to monitoring by the organization Urgewald, in the first eight months of 2026, Yamal's gas carriers made 156 voyages to EU ports, delivering 11.39 million tons of LNG worth more than €7 billion.
However, judging by the final contents of the package, energy provisions were left out of the equation. The reason remains the same — the dependence of certain EU countries on Russian Arctic gas and Brussels' reluctance to exacerbate internal contradictions on the eve of the full ban on imports of Russian LNG coming into force on January 1, 2027.
The Russian side reacted to the package with predictable skepticism. Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Konstantin Kosachev stated: "Nothing has changed since then, the 22nd or 122nd package of sanctions will end in the same way — the failure of the EU sanctions policy… Brussels cannot isolate Russia economically."
This assessment does have a foundation. While the EU expands its blacklists, Moscow keeps ramping up energy exports, and not only to Asia. The case of diesel is particularly noteworthy — it now has a path open to the US as well.
The 22nd package lays bare the fundamental problem of European sanctions policy. The EU finds itself caught between two contradictions: on the one hand, it cannot afford a full ban on maritime services for Russian tankers because of the position of ship-owning countries. On the other, it cannot ignore the demonstrative easing of sanctions by Washington without risking a loss of face.
But if we compare the 22nd package with the 21st one, adopted on July 23, the picture becomes even more telling. At that time, Brussels imposed sanctions on dozens of tankers, tightened control over the price cap, "struck" several Russian refineries and oil traders, as well as two ports. The energy bloc was, if not decisive, then at least noticeable.
Now, however, the energy component has shrunk to almost nothing. A package positioned as the "most sweeping" in fact demonstrates the opposite dynamic: the louder the declarations, the fewer the real levers.
The trend is eloquent. Energy sanctions are the most painful for both sides, but they are precisely the ones that wear out fastest. Greece, Malta, and other ship-owning countries block the ban on maritime services for Russian tankers. Hungary and Slovakia bargain for continued supplies of energy resources from Russia. And, say, German industrialists (the EU's industrial vanguard), suffocating under high energy prices, speak ever more loudly of "unintended consequences." As a result, Brussels, despite its politicization, is forced to balance between the desire to punish Moscow and the reluctance to punish itself. Each new package is a compromise in which the energy component is sacrificed to the notorious unity.
While the EU convenes in Luxembourg, real energy flows run in other directions. Russia is increasing supplies primarily to Asia. And the US is opening a window for Russian diesel, albeit guided by its own electoral interests.
In this configuration, the EU's sanction packages increasingly resemble ritual gestures. Brussels keeps expanding its lists, but real energy flows have long since moved past them — and this divergence between declaration and reality is becoming ever harder to ignore.
